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Abstract. From October 5-10, 2003, the Dagstuhl Seminar 03411 Language-
Based Security was held in the International Conference and Research
Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several partici-
pants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open pro-
blems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the
seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together
in this paper.
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Analyzing Memory Accesses in x86 executables
Gogul Balaskrishnan (Univ. Wisconsin - Madison)
This talk concerns static-analysis algorithms for analyzing binary executables.
The aim of the work is to recover intermediate representations (IRs) that are
similar to those that can be created for a program written in a high-level lan-
guage. Our goal is to perform this task for programs such as viruses, worms,
and mobile code. For such programs, symbol-table and debugging information
is either entirely absent, or cannot be relied upon if present; hence, the analysis
described in the paper makes no use of symbol-table/debugging information.
The main analysis that will be discussed, called value-set analysis, tracks
address-valued and integer-valued quantities simultaneously. It is related to pointer-
analysis algorithms that have been developed for programs written in high-level
languages, which determine an over-approximation of the set of variables whose
addresses each pointer variable can hold. At the same time, value-set analysis
is similar to range analysis and other numeric static-analysis algorithms that
over-approximate the integer values that each variable can hold.
The techniques that will be described have been implemented as part of Co-
deSurfer/x86, a prototype tool for browsing (surﬁng), inspecting, and analyzing
x86 executables.
Joint work of: Balaskrishnan, Gogul; Reps, Thomas;
Stack-based Access Control for Secure Information Flow
Anindya Banerjee (Kansas State University)
Access control mechanisms are often used with the intent of enforcing conﬁ-
dentiality and integrity policies, but few rigorous connections have been made
between information ﬂow and runtime access control.
The Java virtual machine and the .NET runtime system provide a dynamic
access control mechanism in which permissions are granted to program units
and a runtime mechanism checks permissions of code in the calling chain. We
investigate a design pattern by which this mechanism can be used to achieve
conﬁdentiality and integrity goals: a single interface serves callers of more than
one security level and dynamic access control prevents release of high information
to low callers. Programs ﬁtting this pattern would be rejected by previous ﬂow
analyses. We give a static analysis that admits them, using permission-dependent
security types. The analysis is given for a class-based object-oriented language
with features including inheritance, dynamic binding, recursive types and type
casts. The analysis is shown to ensure a noninterference property formalizing
conﬁdentiality and integrity.
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Joint work of: Banerjee, Anindya; Naumann, David A.;
Flexibility and Trustworthiness in Proof-Carrying Code
Andrew Bernard (CMU - Pittsburgh)
Proof-carrying code (PCC) is a framework for ensuring that untrusted programs
are safe to install and execute. When using PCC, programs are required to con-
tain a proof that allows the program text to be checked statically and eﬃciently
for safe behavior. I will present an engineering improvement to PCC that sim-
pliﬁes the checking software and simultaneously enables the proof to be checked
against an explicit temporal-logic security-policy speciﬁcation.
To make this approach practical, our checking software reconstructs a safety
proof from the trace of an untrusted logic program. Our experiments suggest
that proof sizes can remain small if we spend additional time on proof checking.
Joint work of: Bernard, Andrew; Lee, Peter; Donohue, Michael; Magill, Ste-
phen;
Automatic Proof of Strong Secrecy for Security Protocols
Bruno Blanchet (MPI für Informatik)
We present a new automatic technique for proving strong secrecy for security
protocols. Strong secrecy means that an adversary cannot see any diﬀerence when
the value of the secret changes. Strong secrecy detects implicit ﬂows and ﬂows
of partial information. It is a particular case of observational equivalence, which
gives nice compositionality properties and makes it easier to combine manual
and automatic proofs. Our technique relies on an automatic translation of the
protocol into Horn clauses, and a resolution algorithm on the clauses. It requires
important extensions with respect to previous work for (syntactic) secrecy and
authenticity. This technique can handle a wide range of cryptographic primitives,
and yields proofs valid for an unbounded number of sessions and an unbounded
message space; it is also ﬂexible and eﬃcient. We have proved its correctness, its
termination on the large class of tagged protocols, and implemented it.
Type-based Security in Ambient-based Calculi: A Calculus
of Bounded Capacities
Michele Bugliesi (Univ. Ca' Foscari - Venezia)
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Resource control has attracted increasing interest in foundational research on
distributed systems. In this talk, I focus focuses on space control and describe
an analysis of space usage in the context of an ambient-like calculus with boun-
ded capacities and weighed processes, where migration and activation require
space. A type system complements the dynamics of the calculus by providing
static guarantees that the intended capacity bounds are preserved throughout
the computation.
Joint work of: Bugliesi, Michele; Barbanera, Franco; Dezani, Mariangiola;
Sassone, Vladimiro;
Correspondence Assertions for Process Synchronization in
Concurrent Communications
Adriana Compagnoni (Stevens Institute of Technology)
High-level speciﬁcation of patterns of communications such as protocols can be
modeled elegantly by means of session types. However, a number of examples
suggest that session types fall short when ﬁner precision on protocol speciﬁcation
is required. In order to increase the expressiveness of session types we appeal to
the theory of correspondence assertions. The resulting type discipline augments
the types of long term channels with eﬀects and thus yields types which may
depend on messages read/written prior within the same session. We prove that
evaluation preserves typability and that well-typed processes are safe. Also, we
illustrate how the resulting theory allows us to address the shortcomings present
in the pure theory of session types.
In Proceedings of FOCLASA 2003.
Joint work of: Bonelli, Eduardo; Compagnoni, Adriana; Gunter, Elsa
Information Leakage Analysis in Mobile Ambients
Agostino Cortesi (Univ. Ca' Foscari - Venezia)
A multilevel security policy is considered in the scenario of mobile systems, and
modeled within pure Mobile Ambients calculus, in which no communication
channels are present and the only possible actions are represented by the mo-
ves performed by mobile processes. Information ﬂow is deﬁned in terms of the
possibility for a conﬁdential ambient/data to move outside a security bounda-
ry. A control ﬂow analysis is presented, as a reﬁnement of the Hansen-Jensen-
Nielsons's CFA, that allows to capture boundary crossings with better accuracy.
In this way, both direct and information leakage may be statically detected.
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Joint work of: Cortesi, Agostino; Braghin, Chiara; Focardi, Riccardo;
Information Flow Control for Cryptographic Applets
Mads Dam (Swedish Institute of CS)
We consider the problem of protecting conﬁdentiality of critical data such as
private keys, pin's, or application data in the context of cryptographic protocols.
In this case multi-level security is not in general applicable. Based on earlier
work on admissible interference we propose an automaton-based framework for
describing ﬂows of sensitive data, involving dynamically changing security levels.
We give two successive generalisations of Volpano-Smith type non-interference in
terms of bisimulation-like relations, corresponding to a form of intransitive non-
interference in one case, and controlled downgrading in another. A preliminary
study based on a JavaCard 2.0 implementation of PKCS#11 seems to indicate
that the ﬂow automata we propose are expressive enough to capture the intended
ﬂows of the private RSA exponent in a compact and natural way.
Joint work of: Dam, Mads; Giambiagi, Pablo;
Deﬁnition of Memory Safety
Drew Dean (SRI - Menlo Park)
The term memory safety is often used, but there is no canonical deﬁnition
of it. We ﬁrst identify requirements for a useful deﬁntion from the viewpoint
of computer security. In work in progress, we propose a deﬁnition based on a
coloring invariant that meets 2 of the 3 requirements, and may be extensible to
meet the third requirement.
Approximate Non-Interference
Alessandra Di Pierro (Università di Pisa)
In this work we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of pro-
babilistic concurrent systems by introducing notions of approximate conﬁnement
based on various process equivalences.
We re-cast the operational semantics classically expressed via probabilistic
transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operators and we show a technique
for deﬁning approximate semantics as probabilistic abstract interpretations of
the PTS semantics.
An operator norm is then used to quantify this approximation.
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This provides a quantitative measure of the indistinguishability of two pro-
cesses and therefore of their conﬁnement.
To this quantity we then give a statistical interpretation which relates it to
the number of tests needed to breach the security of the system.
Joint work of: Di Pierro, Alessandra; Hankin, Chris; Wiklicky, Herbert;
Type-Based Distributed Access Control
Dominic Duggan (Stevens Institute of Technology)
The Key-Based Decentralized Label Model (KDLM) is a type system that com-
bines a weak form of information ﬂow control, termed distributed access control,
with typed cryptographic operations. The motivation is to have a type system
that ensures access control and secure data sharing, while giving the applicati-
on the responsibility to secure network communications, and to do this safely.
KDLM introduces the notion of declassiﬁcation certiﬁcates, a form of distributed
declassiﬁcation to support the declassiﬁcation of encrypted data.
Joint work of: Duggan, Dominic; Chothia, Tom; Vitek, Jan;
Language-based Security in Authentication Protocols
Riccardo Focardi (Univ. Ca' Foscari - Venezia)
We propose a new method for the static analysis of entity authentication proto-
cols. Our approach draws on an earlier work on a role-based characterization of
the formal properties of this class of protocols. We develop our approach based
on a dialect of the spi-calculus as the underlying formalism for expressing pro-
tocol narrations. Our analysis validates the honest protocol participants against
static (hence decidable) and easily checked conditions that provide formal gua-
rantees of entity authentication. The main result is that the validation of each
component is provably sound and fully compositional: if all the protocol partici-
pants are successfully validated, then the protocol as a whole guarantees entity
authentication in the presence of Dolev-Yao intruders.
Joint work of: Focardi, Riccardo; Bugliesi, Michele; Maﬀei, Matteo;
Types for Stack-Based Access Control
Jeﬀrey Foster (University of Maryland)
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Stack-based access control is a mechanism used in systems such as Java and the
Common Language Runtime to deﬁne and enforce ﬁne-grain security policies.
We develop a new type system for statically enforcing stack-based access control.
In our system, key-pairs guard access to resources, and the association between
key-pairs and resources can be changed at any program point (i.e., the binding
is late). Our type system uses lexically scoped abstract names and ordering
between them to allow local access control policies to be enforced in other parts
of the code. In particular, this means that individual program components can
locally reﬁne access control policies, and the policies will be respected by the
entire program.
The result is a static type system that can enforce, at compile time, a wide
variety of useful, ﬁne-grain access control patterns.
Joint work of: Foster, Jeﬀrey; Terauchi, Tachio; Aiken, Alex;
A Semantics for Web Services Authentication
Cedric Fournet (Microsoft Research UK)
We consider the problem of specifying and verifying cryptographic security pro-
tocols for XML web services. The security speciﬁcation WS-Sec describes a range
of XML security tokens, such as username tokens, public-key certiﬁcates, and
digital signature blocks, amounting to a ﬂexible vocabulary for expressing pro-
tocols. To describe the syntax of these tokens, we extend the usual XML data
model with symbolic representations of cryptographic values. We use predicates
on this data model to describe the semantics of security tokens and of sample
protocols distributed with the WSE implementation of WS-Sec. By embedding
our data model within Abadi and Fournet's applied pi calculus, we formulate
and prove security properties with respect to the standard Dolev-Yao threat mo-
del. Moreover, we informally discuss issues not addressed by the formal model.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst approach to the speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation of security protocols based on a faithful account of the XML wire
format.
Latest slides and papers are available from http://securing.ws and
http://research.microsoft.com/ fournet
Joint work of: Fournet, Cedric; Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Gordon, Andrew D.;
Inherently Safe Mobile Code Formats
Michael Franz (Univ. California - Irvine)
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Java pioneered the concept of mobile code veriﬁcation, checking a mobile pro-
gram itself (instead of a digital signature) to test whether it is safe to run. Later
came Proof Carrying Code, which enables to shift most of the veriﬁcation eﬀort
from code consumer to code producer. We have invented a third alternative, by
which unsafe programs cannot even be encoded in an intermediate representation
to begin with, eliminating the need for veriﬁcation altogether.
Abstract non-interference
Roberto Giacobazzi (Università di Verona)
In this paper we introduce the notion of parametric non-interference relatively to
an observation. This means that no unauthorized ﬂow of information is possible
in programs from conﬁdential to public data, relatively to what the attacker can
observe on input/output.
The idea is to consider attackers as dataﬂow analyzers, whose task is to reveal
properties of conﬁdential resources by analyzing public ones. We prove that this
notion can be fully speciﬁed in standard abstract interpretation framework, ma-
king the degree of security of a program a property of its semantics. We introduce
systematic methods for extracting attackers from programs, providing a domain-
theoretic characterization of the most precise attacker which cannot violate the
security of a given program. These methods allow us both to compare attackers
and program secrecy by comparing the corresponding abstractions in the lattice
of abstract interpretations, and to design automatic program certiﬁcation tools
for security by abstract interpretation.
Joint work of: Giacobazzi, Roberto; Mastroeni, Isabella;
Protocol Analysis (Tutorial)
Dieter Gollmann (TU Hamburg-Harburg)
Major issues in protocol analysis can be linked back to the inﬂuential paper by
Dolev & Yao [IEEE-IT, 1983].
In terms of modeling environment and attacks, the Dolev-Yao model gives
the adversary full control of the communications system. In terms of analytical
methods, the adversary is restricted to algebraic manipulations on strings of sym-
bols. Thus, protocol analysis in the Dolev-Yao model becomes a term-rewriting
problem.
Modeling issues beyond Dolev-Yao touch on the distinction between outsider
attacks (the traditional view in protocol analysis) and insider attacks (such as
Lowes attack on the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol), or with scenarios
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where it is not assumed that the adversary has full control of the communications
system (example: analysis of binding updates in Mobile IPv6).
As security in the Dolev-Yao model is translated into the word problem in
type 0 languages, security is undecidable in general. Research has therefore either
identiﬁed classes of protocols where eﬃcient algorithms exist, or developed and
extended techniques that work for restricted models or need not terminate for
correct protocols.
In the evaluation of analysis methods, one should distinguish between tools
for the analysis of protocols that should meet well established goals and use
well established cryptographic mechanisms, and tools for the analysis of novel
protocols. The latter case requires agile methodologies where it is easy to
adjust the model of the environment and the formalization of security goals.
Safe and Flexible Memory Management in Cyclone
Michael Hicks (University of Maryland)
Cyclone is a type-safe programming language intended for applications requiring
control over memory management. Our previous work on Cyclone included sup-
port for stack allocation, lexical region allocation, and a garbage-collected heap.
We achieved safety (i.e., prevented dangling pointers) through a region-based
type-and-eﬀects system. This paper describes some new memory-management
mechanisms that we have integrated into Cyclone: dynamic regions, unique poin-
ters, and reference-counted objects. Our experience shows that these new me-
chanisms are well suited for the timely recovery of objects in situations where
it is awkward to use lexical regions. Crucially, programmers can write reusable
functions without unnecessarily restricting callers' choices among the variety of
memory-management options. To achieve this goal, Cyclone employs a combina-
tion of polymorphism and scoped constructs that temporarily let us treat objects
as if they were allocated in a lexical region. Experience writing two server app-
lications using our new constructs was positive: compared to using conservative
garbage collection, memory usage could be signiﬁcantly reduced, and throughput
improved by up to 42
Paper link at http://www.cs.umd.edu/ mwh/papers/cyclone-mm.pdf. Cyclo-
ne homepage at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/cyclone/.
Joint work of: Hicks, Michael; Morrisett, Greg; Grossman, Dan; Jim, Trever;
Pi-Calculus, Flow Analysis and Non-Interference
Kohei Honda (Queen Mary College - London)
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We consider how we can use the pi-calculus to have a precise analysis of the
idea of information ﬂow in programs. The idea is to make the best of a precise
representability of diverse programming languages in typed processes, to allow
an analysis which is both intuitive and lucid, combining both data and control
ﬂows. Extracting information ﬂow in a given typed process in the pi-calculus
is easier than extracting from programs simply because operations  reading
variables, calling procedures, communicating with remote objects, etc.  are all
represented as sequences of tiny interactions of name passing processes. If time
remains, we shall also discuss a theoretical underpinning of such an endeavour:
the idea of polarity in interactions, as discussed in both pi-calculus studies and
Linear Logic, plays a basic role in ﬂow analyses of both sequential and concurrent
processes.
Quantitative Analysis of Leakage of Conﬁdential
Information
Sebastian Hunt (City University - London)
Programs whose high-inputs have no eﬀect on their low-outputs are said to
satisfy the non-interference condition. We address the question of what more
can be said about programs which do not satisfy non-interference. We show how
Shannon's information theory can be used to deﬁne a measure of how much
information a program transmits from its high-inputs to its outputs.
We describe a quantitative analysis for a While language; the analysis calcu-
lates bounds on the leakage into each variable under worst-case assumptions of
the choice of low-inputs. This work improves upon the authors' previous work
by dealing with programs which contain loops and by reﬁning their previous
treatments of arithmetic and boolean expressions.
Joint work of: Hunt, Sebastian; Clark, David; Malacaria, Pasquale;
A Theorem Proving Approach to Analysis of Secure
Information Flow
Reiner Hähnle (Chalmers UT - Göteborg)
Most attempts at analysing secure information ﬂow in programs are based on
domain-speciﬁc logics. Though computationally feasible, these approaches suﬀer
from the need for abstraction and the high cost of building dedicated tools for
real programming languages. We recast the information ﬂow problem in a general
program logic rather than a problem-speciﬁc one. We investigate the feasibility of
this approach by showing how a general purpose tool for software veriﬁcation can
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be used to perform information ﬂow analyses. We are able to handle phenomena
like method calls, loops, and object types for the target language Java Card. We
are also able to prove insecurity of programs and to express declassiﬁcation of
information.
Joint work of: Hähnle, Reiner; Darvas, Ádám; Sands, David;
Relative Secrecy and Semantics of Declassiﬁcation
Peeter Laud (University of Tartu)
The concept of relative secrecy covers the case where we want the program's
public outputs to give away no information about the secret inputs, but at the
same time we have determined that certain other outputs, giving away some
information about the secret inputs, give away no sensitive information about
them. In this case we may allow the public outputs to give away some information
about the secret inputs, but nothing more than the aforementioned other outputs
give.
In our talk we give the formal deﬁnition of relative secrecy and also show how
to construct analyses for this property. As a useful application, we show how to
use relative secrecy to give a possible formal meaning for declassify-statements
that are used to mark that a certain variable at a certain program point does not
contain sensitive information, even if a program analysis for secure information
ﬂow inferes that it does.
Joint work of: Laud, Peeter; Ülikool, Tartu;
Roles & Security
Gurvan Le Guernic (Kansas State University)
This talk present a work in progress concerning the declassiﬁcation. In the ma-
jority of works on declassiﬁcation, the main focus is given to the security label
to which the information is declassify. Of course, this label is really important;
but sometimes it can be quite diﬃcult to know what is the value which is
declassiﬁed.
The aim of this work is to add a usage information (role) to the data manipu-
lated by the program. Among those usage informations is deﬁned an interference
relation. This relation gives some information about the source of a value with
a given role. This information is used when the data is declassiﬁed to ensure
that the value declassiﬁed is really the one intended to be declassiﬁed.
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Language-based Security and Formal Software
Development
Heiko Mantel (ETH Zürich)
Language-based security techniques aim at analyzing the security of a given
program after it has been developed. In contrast, the objective of a formal soft-
ware development process is to ensure security already during the development
(security-by-design). In this talk, I will discuss how these two approaches could
be fruitfully integrated. More speciﬁcally, I will outline how language-based ana-
lysis techniques, such as security-type systems, can be used in combination with
the more traditional veriﬁcation techniques like unwinding in order to rigorous-
ly ensure that a system designed to be secure is indeed secure. This possibility
arises from a formal connection between the security properties used in formal
developments and the ones underlying language-based security techniques (joint
work with Andrei Sabelfeld). I will also point out some other interesting direc-
tions that could be exploited on this basis, such as combining diﬀerent analysis
techniques to ensure system-wide security and analyzing programs written in
multiple languages.
A language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
Fabio Martinelli (CNR - Pisa)
In this talk we present a language and a methodology for the analysis of real-
time features of cryptographic protocols. We show how it is suitable to formally
verify security properties of wireless/multicast protocols. We deﬁne also a com-
positional proof rule for establishing security properties of such protocols. The
eﬀectiveness of our approach is shown by deﬁning and studying the timed integri-
ty property for mu-TESLA, a well-known protocol for wireless sensor networks.
We are able to deal with protocol speciﬁcations with an arbitrary number of
agents (senders as well as receivers) running the protocol.
Joint work of: Martinelli, Fabio; Gorrieri, Roberto; Petrocchi, Marinella; Vac-
carelli, Anna;
Composition of Cryptographic Protocols in a Probabilistic
Process Calculus
Paulo Mateus (Instituto Superior Tecnico - Lisboa)
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We describe a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for analyzing cryp-
tographic protocols and use it to derive compositionality properties of protocols
in the presence of computationally bounded adversaries.
We illustrate these concepts on oblivious transfer, an example from crypto-
graphy.
We also compare our approach with a framework based on interactive Turing
machines.
Joint work of: Mateus, Paulo; Mitchell, J.; Scedrov, A.;
Typing Noninterference for a Reactive Language
Ana Matos (INRIA - Sophia Antipolis)
My talk is about the design of a type system for noninterference of programs in
a reactive core language, as well of its soundness proof. The reactive primitives
oﬀer new expressive power with reﬂections on the forms of security leaks that
are to be controlled. On one hand we are able to code interference examples
analogous to those we ﬁnd in concurrent imperative languages (Ex: PIN), and
to use analogous reasonings when designing the typing rules. On the other hand,
the deterministic nature of the reactive concurrency calls for more restrictions
on the set of accepted programs. In addition to the impact on the type system
itself, the deterministic nature of the language allows for an alternative deﬁni-
tion of secure programs, which is usually based on a bisimulation. Inspired by
the Determinacy => (Observation equivalence = Trace equivalence) result by
Engelfriet we establish an equivalence between the bisimulation deﬁnition and
an alternative one using trace-like reasoning. This simpliﬁes the task of proving
the soundness of the type system.
Joint work of: Matos, Ana; Boudol, Gerard; Castellani, Ilaria;
Typed Assembly Language (Background)
Greg Morrisett (Cornell University)
The promise of proof-carrying code (PCC) is that we can enforce a wide ran-
ge of security policies on actual machine code using only a very small trusted
computing base. However, PCC does not eliminate the hard problem of ﬁnding
proofs; it rather shifts the burden from the code consumer to the code producer.
The combination of type-safe, high-level languages and certifying compilers
provides a methodology for achieving the proofs needed in a PCC architecture.
The desired policy is encoded as a type system at the source level. Programmers
help to construct the initial source-level proof by rewriting their code until it
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type-checks (i.e., until a source-level type reconstruction engine can automati-
cally construct the proof.) Often, this requires typing annotations that guide the
type-checker. Certifying compilers conceptually transform the source-level proof
in parallel with the code to produce a proof that the target level code has the
desired properties.
The primary challenge in building a certifying compiler is designing type sy-
stems for low-level languages, including compiler intermediate representations
and ultimately machine code. Today's type systems for virtual machines, such
as the Java VM or Microsoft's Common Language Runtime, tend to be too high-
level in order to keep the type system relatively simple. However, the invariants
imposed by these high-level constructors prevent the expression of certain op-
timizations including tail-call elimination, instruction scheduling, and register
allocation. They also tend to prevent eﬃcient encodings of linguistic features
such as continuations or covariant arrays.
The goal of the TAL project was to examine a RISC approach to the design
of low-level type systems. By providing a set of orthogonal type constructors,
the hope was that higher-level typing abstractions could be adequately encoded.
Keywords: Proof-carrying code, Typed Assembly Language
Using Information Flow Policies to Construct Secure
Distributed Systems
Andrew Myers (Cornell University)
A challenging unsolved security problem is how to specify and enforce system-
wide security policies; this problem is even more acute in distributed systems
with mutual distrust. This talk describes a way to enforce policies for data conﬁ-
dentiality and integrity in such an environment. Programs annotated with secu-
rity speciﬁcations are statically checked and then transformed by the compiler to
run securely on a distributed system with untrusted hosts. The code and data of
the computation are partitioned and replicated across the available hosts in ac-
cordance with the security speciﬁcation and without placing undue trust in any
host. The compiler automatically generates secure run-time protocols for com-
munication among the replicated code partitions. A prototype implementation
has been applied to various distributed programs.
Joint work of: Myers, Andrew; Zheng, Lantian; Chong, Stephen; Zdancewic,
Steve;
Automatic Validation of Protocol Narration
Flemming Nielson (Technical University of Denmark)
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We perform a systematic expansion of protocol narrations into terms of a process
algebra in order to make precise some of the detailed checks that need to be
made in a protocol. We then apply static analysis technology to develop an
automatic validation procedure for protocols. Finally, we demonstrate that these
techniques suﬃce for identifying a number of authentication ﬂaws in symmetric
key protocols such as Needham-Schroeder, Otway-Rees, Yahalom and Andrew
Secure RPC.
Joint work of: Nielson, Flemming; Bodei, Chiara; Degano, Pierpaolo; Buch-
holtz, Mikael; Nielson, Hanne Riis;
Weighted Push Down Systems
Thomas Reps (Univ. Wisconsin - Madison)
This talk concerns the extension of pushdown systems to weighted pushdown
systems, and the application of this formalism to two problems:
o Answering authorization questions for certiﬁcate sets expressed in SPKI/SDSI.
o Performing interprocedural dataﬂow analysis. (Actually, weighted push-
down systems support a generalized form of interprocedural dataﬂow analysis
queries of the form What is the meet-over-all-paths value to [or from] a set of
stack conﬁgurations?, where a set of stack conﬁgurations in a query is a regular
set.)
Joint work of: Reps, Thomas; Schwoon, S.; Jha, S.; Stubblebine, S.;
Non-Interference for the Java Virtual Machine
Tamara Rezk (INRIA - Sophia Antipolis)
The Java Platform combines static and dynamic mechanisms to enforce inno-
cuity of applications, but these mechanisms fail to guarantee that conﬁdential
information will not leak to unauthorized principals. In order to provide stronger
guarantees with respect to conﬁdentiality, it is thus necessary to rely on alter-
native mechanisms, such as static analyses or type systems that enforce non-
interference, a high-level security property that guarantees the absence of illicit
information ﬂows during a program execution. While Banerjee and Naumann
have recently investigated the use of such type systems for the Java language,
there lacks a similar study for the Java Virtual Machine, and more generally for
low-level languages [that] have not received much attention in studies of secure
information ﬂow (Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003). We propose an information ﬂow
type system for a non-trivial fragment of the Java Virtual Machine that includes
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classes, arrays, methods, exceptions and subroutines, and show that it enforces
non-interference. Our type system is compatible with the principles of bytecode
veriﬁcation, and could thus be used as the basis of an enhanced bytecode veriﬁer
for the Java Platform.
Joint work of: Rezk, Tamara; Barthe, Gilles;
Language-Based Information-Flow Security (Tutorial)
Andrei Sabelfeld (Cornell University)
Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that
the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisﬁes important security po-
licies such as conﬁdentiality. An end-to-end conﬁdentiality policy might assert
that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's
observations of system output; this policy regulates information ﬂow.
Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do
not directly address the enforcement of information-ﬂow policies. Recently, a
promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language
techniques for specifying and enforcing information-ﬂow policies. This talk is
intended to give the big picture of recent and current research on information-
ﬂow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to
enforce information-ﬂow policies.
The talk is based on a survey article (IEEE J-SAC, 21(1):5-19, Jan. 2003)
written jointly with Andrew Myers, available via http://www.cs.cornell.edu/ an-
drei/Papers/jsac.ps
Joint work of: Sabelfeld, Andrei; Myers, Andrew C.;
Controlled Downgrading based on Intransitive
(Non)Interference
David Sands (Chalmers UT - Göteborg)
Traditional noninterference cannot cope with common features of secure systems
like channel control, information ﬁltering, or explicit downgrading. Some recent
research in language-based setting has addressed the derivation and use of wea-
ker security conditions that could support some such features. However, a fully
satisfactory solution to the problem has yet to be found. A key problem is to per-
mit exceptions to a given security policy without permitting too much. In this
article, we propose an approach that draws its underlying ideas from intran-
sitive noninterference, a concept usually used on a more abstract speciﬁcation
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level. Our results include a new bisimulation-based security condition that con-
trols tightly where downgrading can occur and a sound security type system for
checking this condition.
Joint work of: Sands, David; Mantel, Heiko;
A Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Calculus for the Analysis
of Cryptographic Protocols
André Scedrov (University of Pennsylvania)
We describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the
purpose of analyzing security protocols. The process calculus is a version of
CCS, with bounded replication and probabilistic polynomial-time expressions
allowed in messages and boolean tests. In order to avoid problems expressing
cryptographic notions in the presence of nondeterminism, messages are schedu-
led probabilistically instead of nondeterministically. We prove that evaluation
may be completed in probabilistic polynomial time and develop properties of
a form of asymptotic protocol equivalence that allows security to be speciﬁed
using observational equivalence, a standard relation from programming language
theory that involves quantifying over possible environments that might interact
with the protocol.
We also relate process equivalence to cryptographic concepts such as indi-
stinguishability by polynomial-time statistical tests.
Joint work of: Scedrov, André; Mitchell, J.; Ramanathan, A.; Teague, V.;
Mateus, P.; Lincoln, P.; Mitchell, M.;
Security Types for Multiagent Systems Development
Axel Schairer (DFKI Saarbrücken)
Starting from global conﬁdentiality requirements for a whole multiagent system
we ﬁrst develop suﬃcient conﬁdentiality requirements for single agents in a goal-
directed way. This involves several design decisions. In a second step, the agents
can then independently be developed to satisfy their respective requirements.
However, these two steps are interdependent and the intended functionality
of the agents has to be taken into account to decompose the requirements in a
sensible way.
We suggest using security types systems to aid in the decomposition.
The agents' algorithms are expressed as pseudo-programs and type-correctness
is related to the conﬁdentiality properties used to express the requirements. The
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global requirement corresponds to certain constraints on the type annotations
of the pseudo-programs.
Propagation according to the type system adds constraints. The result is that
the agents' individual requirements can be read oﬀ the resulting type annotations
of the programs.
A Bisimulation for Dynamic Sealing
Eijiro Sumii (University of Pennsylvania)
We deﬁne lambda-seal, an untyped call-by-value lambda-calculus with primitives
for sealing, and develop a bisimulation proof method that is sound and complete
with respect to contextual equivalence. This provides a formal basis for reasoning
about data abstraction in open, dynamic settings where static techniques such
as type abstraction and logical relations are not applicable.
[Manuscript available at http://www.yl.is.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ sumii/pub/]
Joint work of: Sumii, Eijiro; Pierce, Benjamin C.;
An On-The-Fly Model-Checker for Security Protocol
Analysis
Luca Vigano (ETH Zürich)
The on-the-ﬂy model-checker OFMC is a state-of-the-art tool for analyzing secu-
rity protocols, which owes its success to the combination of two ideas. The ﬁrst
is the modeling of protocols using lazy data-types in a higher-order functional
programming language, which allows for the automated analysis of security pro-
perties using inﬁnite-state model checking, where the model is explicitly built,
on-the-ﬂy, in a demand-driven fashion. The second is the integration of several
search optimizations that are based on symbolic techniques and that signiﬁcant-
ly reduce the inﬁnite search tree associated with a protocol without excluding
any attacks. Extensive experimentation showed that our tool is state-of-the-art,
both in terms of coverage and performance, and that it scales well to industrial-
strength protocols.
Joint work of: Vigano, Luca; Basin, David; Mödersheim, Sebastian;
Analysing the Propagation of Computer Viruses
Herbert Wiklicky (Imperial College London)
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We investigate the problem of how malicious code, i.e. computer viruses, can
infect an entire network. Our approach is based on a probabilistic model descri-
bing the chances that a certain node infects some of its neighbours. We formalise
this situation using a probabilistic version of a process calculus which is the core
of KLAIM, a language for distributed and mobile computing based on interacti-
ons through distributed tuple spaces. The analysis we present exploits tecniques
based on probabilistic abstract interpretation and provides an extimate of the
probability of a virus propagation through a computer network.
Joint work of: Wiklicky, Herbert; Di Pierro, Alessandra; Hankin, Chris;
Secrecy and Fine-Grained Types for Higher-Order Mobile
Code
Nobuko Yoshida (Imperial College London)
In wide area distributed systems it is now common for higher-order code to
be transferred from one domain to another; the receiving host may initialise
parameters and then execute the code in its local environment. In this talk we
analise secrecy property of higher-order mobile code by a ﬁne-grained typing
system for a higher-order pi-calculus which can be used to control the eﬀect of
such migrating code on local environments.
Processes may be assigned diﬀerent types depending on their intended use.
This is in contrast to most of the previous work on typing processes where
all processes are typed by a unique constant type, indicating essentially that
they are well-typed relative to a particular environment. Our ﬁne-grained typing
facilitates the management of access rights and provides host protection from
potentially malicious behaviour.
Our process type takes the form of an interface limiting the resources to
which it has access, and the types at which they may be used. This framework
is smoothly extendable to reason about ﬁne-grained code security depending on
untrust/trust distributed environments.
Security Issues in Coordination Models and Languages
Gianluigi Zavattaro (Università di Bologna)
In this presentation we describe how coordination models and languages are
evolving in order to support the programming of new classes of networks with
a high level of mobility and dynamicity (e.g. mobile ad hoc networks, internet
applications, etc.).
In particular, we focus on the linguistic improvements that are currently
proposed in order to support some form of secure coordination; this is a critical
aspect because the applications in this class of networks are usually open to
previously unknown agents, that could potentially present malicious behaviours.
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First-Class Principals in the Decentralized Label Model
Stephan Zdancewic (University of Pennsylvania)
Type systems that enforce information-ﬂow properties allow the programmer to
express conﬁdentiality and integrity policies on the data used in the program.
Typically, these policies are staticthe security labels on the data are determined
at compile time. In practice, it is sometimes useful to allow the security policies
to depend on run-time information, for instance to permit diﬀerent information
to be visible to users with root privileges. As this example shows, there must also
be some way of connecting dynamic principals and authentication mechanisms.
This talk will present some work in progress on developing a security-typed
language with dynamic principals. The type system, which incorporates a variant
of Myers' and Liskov's decentralized label model, distinguishes between statically
known principals and dynamic ones. An interesting question in this setting is
how to regulate declassiﬁcation when the principal whose authority is needed to
perform the declassiﬁcation may change at run time. I will sketch some ideas
that suggest it is possible to smoothly integrate languages for information-ﬂow
security with public-key infrastructures for authentication.
Joint work of: Zdancewic, Stephan; Tse, Stephen;
